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Abstract—Operations involving small Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (sUAS) in urban environments are occurring ever more 
frequently as recognized applications gain acceptance, and new 
use cases emerge, such as urban air mobility, medical deliveries, 
and support of emergency services. Higher demands in these 
operations and the requirement to access urban airspace 
present new challenges in sUAS operational safety. The presence 
of Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability of sUAS is one of the 
major requirements to its safe operation in urban environments 
according to the current legislation, such as the CAP 722 in the 
United Kingdom (UK). The platform or its operator proves a 
full awareness of all potential obstacles within the mission, 
maintains a safe distance from other airspace users, and, 
ultimately, performs Collision Avoidance (CA) maneuvers to 
avoid imminent impacts. Different missions for the defined 
scenarios are designed and performed within the simulation 
model in Software Tool Kit (STK) software environment, 
covering a wide range of practical cases. The acquired data 
supports assessment of feasibility and requirements to real-time 
processing. Analysis of the findings and simulation results leads 
to a holistic approach to implementation of sUAS operations in 
urban environments, focusing on extracting critical DAA 
capability for safe mission completion. The proposed approach 
forms a valuable asset for safe operations validation, enabling 
better evaluation of risk mitigation for sUAS urban operations 
and safety-focused design of the sensor payload and algorithms. 
Keywords—Detect and Avoid (DAA), small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (sUAS), Safety Operations, Risk Mitigation in 
Urban Environments. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
For years, a global market for Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) has been developing. The global UAS market is 
estimated to be USD 27.4 billion in 2021 and is projected to 
reach USD 58.4 billion by 2026, at a Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) of 16.4% from 2021 to 2026 [1]. Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) are rapidly used in urban 
environments to accomplish various operations such as 
medical deliveries, commercial package delivery, critical 
infrastructure inspection, precision agriculture, and search and 
rescue operations. These operations require establishing 
safety mechanisms at both the infrastructure and sUAS 
application levels. The use of sUAS in urban environments 
meets the definition of a safety-critical system whose failure 
could lead to loss of life, considerable damage to property, or 
environmental damage. The problem is multifaceted, and 
appropriate levels of safety can only be obtained at the 
systems level by holistically considering the hardware, 
software, and operator aspects of the infrastructure and their 
interactions with potentially untrusted sUAS [2]. Safety risks 
and required mitigations are of particular interest for an urban 
infrastructure that manages sUAS in the monitored airspace. 
This includes awareness of their state, location, and 
characteristics while ensuring that new sUAS entering the 
airspace meet minimum safety-related performance 
requirements. 
This work focuses on evaluating safety for sUAS 
operations within urban environments and discussing practical This work is supported by Innovate UK funding, grant number 84765 
considerations for the development of DAA capabilities for 
safe operations. The ability to Detect and Avoid is a critical 
enabler for the safe integration of sUAS into the airspace. One 
of the primary challenges of such capability is meeting Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) CAP 722 requirements for 
detecting and avoiding other aircraft, when operating in an 
urban environment [3]. However, Beyond Visual Line of 
Sight (BVLOS) sUAS operations in a non-segregated airspace 
will not normally be permitted without an acceptable DAA 
capability [4]. DAA systems are intended to allow sUAS to 
“Remain Well Clear " (RWC) and avoid collisions with other 
airborne traffic. In order to do so, an objective definition of 
RWC is required. DAA is required to provide detection and 
guidance to maintain RWC and, if it is lost, recovery guidance 
is required in order to regain it. The DAA system should 
provide the following functions to support DAA capability 
[5]: 
• Detection - Use one or more onboard sensors to detect 
obstacles. 
• Track - Use detection results to estimate obstacles 
positions and velocities. 
• Evaluate - Assess collision risk of tracked obstacles. 
• Prioritize - Assess threat priorities/hazards (urgency 
levels). 
• Declare - Alert remote pilot to avoidance action 
required. 
• Determine - Decide what action to take. 
• Command - Communicate the action for execution. 
• Execute - Execute the commanded action. 
The main contributions in this paper for safer DAA urban 
operations are as follows: 
• A review of the state-of-the-art technologies used for 
DAA.  
• A set of representative urban scenarios, incorporating 
elements of DAA potential challenges, such as 
irregular buildings height, vegetation, and crowded 
airspace. 
• Heterogeneous missions for the defined scenarios, 
covering a wide range of practical cases. 
• Complete scenarios simulation by integrating the 
platform model with DAA supporting technologies, 
including navigation, communication and collision 
avoidance.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section II presents the Detect and avoid technologies. Section 
III sets out the DAA approach in simulation and the process 
of Well Clear volumes in sUAS. Section IV compares and 
analyzes the performance and practical considerations of 
DAA. Section V concludes the proposed DAA approach. 
II. DETECT AND AVOID TECHNOLOGIES AND 
ARCHITECTURES 
The literature review of the DAA includes technologies 
and approaches that could be used on an sUAS and enable the 
CAA to understand the types of DAA available for sUAS 
operating in the airspace. Initially, the DAA requirements are 
derived from sections 111 and 113 of Part 91 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FAR). The FARs are part of Title 14 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). FAR 91.111 
addresses “Operating near other aircraft,” while FAR 91.113 
addresses “Right-of-way rules.” FAR 91.111 prohibits 
operations, so close to another aircraft as to create a collision 
hazard. According to FAR 91.113, each person operating an 
aircraft must maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft 
[6]. Many different existing systems propose DAA 
capabilities for UAS, such as Air Force’s Multiple Sensor 
Integrated Conflict Avoidance (MuSICA)/Jointly Optimal 
Conflict Avoidance (JOCA) [7], the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Detect and Avoid Alerting 
Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) [8], the 
Terrestrial Acoustic Sensor Array (TASA), SARA’s acoustic 
sense and avoid systems [9], Advanced U-space services and 
technologies (U3 and U4), SESAR U-space development of 
miniaturized, automated Detect and Avoid functionalities  
[10][11], a NASA’s SAA algorithm of Independent 
Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of 
Unmanned Systems (ICAROUS) [12], and the New Mexico 
State University and University of North Dakota Alliance for 
System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence 
(ASSURE). However, these DAA technologies for UAS are 
mainly focusing for larger aircrafts, whereas integrating DAA 
capabilities in sUAS is quite challenging. To define and 
understand the DAA problem, a standard system engineering 
approach was used to systematically approach the problem, 
including evaluating DAA requirements and potential 
technology solutions. Cooperative and non-cooperative 
technologies examined by performing a DAA function on the 
sUAS are shown in Fig. 1. Active and passive sensor systems 
are included in the discussion of non-cooperative 
technologies.  
A. Well Clear Recommendation 
The “Well Clear” recommendation of a DAA system 
combines a RWC function and an optional Collision 
Avoidance (CA) function [13]. The main differences between 
RWC and CA are shown in Table 1. The RWC function 
provides tactical maneuvers to remain Well Clear, while the 
CA function provides urgent maneuvers intended to prevent 
midair collisions [14]. The need for determining a Well Clear 
definition for UAS was identified early in Sense and Avoid 
 
Fig. 1 Overview of DAA technologies 
(SAA) system development. As the remote pilot of a UAS 
cannot provide the same ‘see and avoid' mitigation for 
potential hazards, the UAS itself must be capable of 
performing an equivalent function.  The proximity of hazards 
at different zones is illustrated in Fig. 2. One of the highest 
priorities for a “Well Clear” is the guarantee of staying within 
a given geospatial containment volume [15], where the 
separation is based upon the thread and the intruder aircraft. 
The RWC threshold and RWC volume, collision volume, and 
collision avoidance threshold are shown in Fig. 3 as defined 
in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) ICAO RPAS 
Manual [16].  
Table 1: Main differences between RWC and CA [18] 






Depends on airspace 
(can be shared with 
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Conflict (CoC) 
Collision 
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Maneuver 
Constraints 




There are different “Well Clear” concepts for UAS, such 
as a closest point of approach (CPA) and time-to-CPA from 
NASA; a time-based image with distance modifications from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, 
and an ellipsoidal idea defined by aircraft speed with varying 
vertical dimension from Air Force Research Laboratory [17]. 
In their work the Well Clear principles are tuned to a standard 
level of unmitigated collision using Monte Carlo analysis, 
resulting in tuned UAS Well Clear recommendations with an 
equivalent risk of a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC). 
Furthermore, the operational suitability of the Well Clear 
volume is evaluated using Monto Carlo simulation, Human-
in-the-loop simulation, Stressing Case analysis, and fast-time 
simulation.  
The Traffic Collision Avoidance System II Resolution 
Advisory Rate (TCAS II RA), controller acceptability 
considerations, Well Clear volume, cross-track deviation, 
vertical deviation, maneuver initial point, CPA miss 
distance/time given Well Clear violation and mitigated risk 
ratio are the metrics evaluated during the different simulation 
process as mentioned above. For the sUAS these functions 
required redefinition. Rather than including separate RWC 
and CA functions, sUAS will include one level of alerting and 
guidance, with the separation volume based on intruder type 
[19]. The Well Clear recommendations inform the scalable 
separation volume, and the considered metrics were 
probability of a NMAC, probability of loss of Well Clear 
(PLoWC), horizontal miss distance, and vertical miss 
distance.  
Also, there have been studies on collision risk assessment 
[20] [21] based on the dynamic model of the sUAS, but these 
methods are mathematically complex to be utilized online. 
B. Cooperative Technologies  
1) Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS): The 
Detect and Avoid function includes two functions to UASs: 
Traffic Avoidance (TA) and Collision Avoidance (CA). TA 
allows you to keep a safe distance from other airspace users. 
CA enables last-second maneuvering to avoid NMAC. Air 
traffic control ensures aircraft separation, so TA is not 
required in controlled airspace. Pilots currently perform 
collision avoidance with the assistance of dedicated avionics, 
such as TCAS II. Existing collision avoidance logic, on the 
other hand, is reaching its limits. Air Traffic Management 
modernization efforts (NextGen and SESAR) have addressed 
this issue by developing new collision avoidance 
technologies, updating ACAS II [22]. The group of experts 
tasked with developing this new collision avoidance 
technology settled on a decision-theoretic planning method 
called ACAS X. This method is available in several variations 
based on a common framework. ACAS Xa is designed for 
large aircraft, ACAS Xo is for special operations, ACAS Xu 
is for unmanned aircraft, ACAS Xp is for general aviation 
and ACAS sXu is for sUAS. As with other ACAS X variants, 
sXu consists of two primary modules, the Surveillance and 
Tracking Module (STM) and the Threat Resolution Module 
(TRM). 
The function of the ACAS sXu STM is to present an 
estimated state of the location to the Threat Resolution 
Module TRM. The ACAS sXu addresses the critical 
challenges of providing timely DAA advisories that are 
robust to noisy surveillance sources and the uncertain nature 
of aircraft future trajectories. These difficulties are overcome 
 
Fig. 2 Proximity of hazards 
 
Fig. 3 Definition of Well Clear and Collision Avoidance Volume 
by modeling the DAA problem as a Markov Decision Process 
(MDP) [19]. The TRM typically consists of two action phases 
horizontal action phase and the vertical action phase. The 
vertical action phase consists of five actions: Clear-of-
conflict (CoC), Do Not Climb, Do Not Descend, Climb, and 
Descent. The horizontal action phase consists of CoC, turn 
right and turn left actions. The ACAS sXu implementation 
includes two scaling options: one for sUAS vs sUAS and 
another for sUAS vs manned. 
2) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast: 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
technology was introduced more than two decades ago to 
improve surveillance within the airspace. ADS-B enables 
autopilots and ground-based stations to detect other similarly 
equipped aircraft in the airspace with higher 
efficiency precision [23]. It automatically acquires 
parameters from relevant airborne equipment, Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), broadcasts to ground 
equipment and other aircraft information, such as aircraft 
position, altitude, speed, flight direction, atnd aircraft 
identification. It achieves true flight information sharing and 
has significant benefits in reinforcing ground-to-air, air-to-
air, and ground-to-ground coordination. The aircraft is 
transmitting a signal containing aircraft broadcast 
information (ADS-B OUT), and the signal receiver receives 
the information if the aircraft meets the necessary 
specifications [24].  
3) ADS-B Traffic Advisory System (ATAS): ATAS detects 
and alerts pilots to potential traffic conflicts using ADS-B. By 
combining ADS-B tracking data with proximity-prediction 
algorithms, ATAS monitors potential traffic conflicts [25]. 
When ATAS detects a conflict, it emits an audible alert 
(traffic callout). Conflicting aircraft are also highlighted on 
cockpit displays when such displays are available in an 
airplane. After receiving an ATAS alert, the pilot takes action 
following the operational rules in effect at the time. Unlike 
TCAS II systems, ATAS does not provide resolution 
advisories [26]. ATAS was designed to operate in the Visual 
Flight Rule (VFR) traffic pattern at small general aviation 
airports, where most general aviation collisions occur without 
excessive nuisance alerts. 
C. Non-Cooperative Technologies 
Non-cooperative technologies, which do not rely on other 
aircraft, are among the promising technologies for use in 
sUAS DAA systems. The non-cooperative technology differs 
from cooperative technologies in that they do not require the 
use of other aircraft in the same airspace to avoid collisions. 
The non-cooperative technologies benefit from the fact that 
they can detect both ground-based and airborne obstacles. 
These non-cooperative technologies are classified into two 
types: active and passive. To detect obstacles in the flight 
path, active systems are used by sending out a signal. Radar 
and laser techniques are examples of active systems. Passive 
systems do not send out a signal, instead of detecting signals 
emitted by the obstacles themselves. Examples of passive 
systems include electro-optical (EO), infra-red (IR), thermal, 
motion detection, visionary and acoustic systems. 
1) Active Systems: The radar is one of the primary sources 
to detect the non-cooperative targets in the airspace. The 
radar can be equipped either onboard or ground-based for 
sUAS. The onboard Sense and Avoid (SAA) capability, 
known as Independent Configurable Architecture for 
Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems (ICAROUS), 
developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, provides 
autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks onboard 
radar. NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership 
conducted the flight test to investigate the applicability and 
performance of a prototype commercially available sUAS 
radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic. The 
radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated 
Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120-degree azimuth 
and 80-degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz 
center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth [27]. The 
ground-based radar can be integrated with a Ground-Based 
DAA system (GBDAA). The GBDAA uses ground-based 
surveillance, tracking, and other capabilities to Detect and 
Avoid obstacles to sUAS [28]. SRC Inc. GBDAA radar 
system is one such example of a ground-based radar [29]. It 
is an integrated, flexible, and scalable approach that enables 
sUAS flights to Detect and Avoid another aircraft. This 
solution is based on the a Lightweight Surveillance and 
Target Acquisition Radar (LSTAR) system, with a low 
lifecycle cost. The radars in the LSTAR system are remotely 
operated and send their detection and tracking information to 
a central fusion processor. This information is then correlated 
with available data to provide a complete and robust 
surveillance network capable of meeting the DAA 
requirements. 
Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) is becoming a 
promising technology for obstacle warning and avoidance in 
a variety of manned and unmanned aircraft applications. 
LiDAR's outstanding angular resolution and accuracy 
characteristics are coupled to its good detection performance 
in a wide range of incidence angles and weather conditions, 
providing an ideal obstacle avoidance solution, which is 
especially attractive in sUAS [30]. The Laser Obstacle 
Avoidance Marconi (LOAM) system is one such system, 
which was jointly developed and tested by SELEX-ES and 
the Italian Air Force Research and Flight Test Centre. The 
laser-based obstacle detection, warning, and avoidance 
capabilities are critical for ensuring the safety of flight 
operations [31]. Another example of the laser system for 
sUAS is the LiDAR Obstacle Warning and Avoidance 
System (LOWAS) [32]. It is a low-weight/low-volume 
navigation aid system specifically designed to detect 
potentially dangerous ground and aerial obstacles placed in 
or near the planned flight trajectory, providing timely 
warnings for the crew to implement effective avoidance 
maneuvers. 
2) Passive Systems: The EO systems require light as a 
primary source to detect obstacles and have advantages 
compared to radar. The radar in the airspace has a 
disadvantage of its increased size and weight, large power 
consumption, and high price. But nowadays, low size, 
weight, and power (SWaP) sensors like EO are researched 
and used to detect aircraft the airspace[33]. The DAA system 
requirements apply to a broader range of operations and 
vehicles, including non-cooperative sUAS with low SWaP. 
This lower performance class of sensors aids sUAS operating 
at slower speeds and lower altitudes, where ADS-B 
transponders are not currently required., i.e., below 10,000 ft 
mean sea level (MSL) and 100 knots true airspeed (KTAS) 
[34]. EO sensor-based aircraft detection is developed quickly 
with deep-learning-based detection and recognition [35]. The 
main issue with EO/low SWaP sensor-based aircraft is their 
short detection range and weather dependencies. 
The IR system, which aids the EO sensor detection at 
night, is not affected by electromagnetic interference and can 
measure distance to obstacle by using IR light radiated from 
objects. Thermal imaging sensors detect heat in all-weather 
operation, whereas motion detectors function by sensing the 
direction and velocity of objects [36]. The spatial-temporal 
filter detection methods have emerged as potential vision-
based aircraft detection systems for the DAA problem (at 
least for detecting aircraft collisions from the airspace 
region). The detection system needs to be physically mounted 
on the platform to allow sensing in the direction of potential 
collision course aircraft. 
SARA (Scientific Applications and Research Associates, 
Inc.) created a small acoustic sensor system for sUAS. The 
Terrestrial Acoustic Sensor Array (TASA) is an acoustic 
phased array system that detects aircraft, classifies collision 
threats, and commands evasive maneuvers to allow sUAS to 
fly BVLOS safely. TASA can detect aircraft even when their 
line of sight is obstructed by trees, buildings, or terrain 
features [9]. Another acoustic-based technology from SARA 
is the Passive Acoustic Non-cooperative Collision Alert 
System (PANCAS). It is used to detects and tracks the sound 
of aircraft engines, propellers, or aircraft rotors. The PANCAS 
sensor array comprises several microphones arranged so that 
they provide bearing information for sound at each frequency 
[37]. The microphone array determines the bearing angle in 
azimuth and elevation by utilizing phase differences at the 
microphones. Different types of non-cooperative technologies 
related to detection and range are compared and shown in 
Table 2. 






















































                                                          
1 Urban canyons can be defined as places where the street is flanked on both sides  by buildings and vegetation.  
III. DAA SIMULATION 
Simulating aerial operations across urban areas is 
challenging due to the complex geometrical nature of the 
built-up environment that greatly impacts signal propagation 
and communication loss models. This section presents 
different software setups conceived to complement each other 
and covers a wider range of considerations regarding DAA 
assessment.  
A. Mission environment 
The core DAA simulation environment is developed in 
Systems Tool Kit (STK) software, a platform for mission and 
systems modelling [39]. In Fig. 4 an overview of the proposed 
simulation setup is presented, including complete platform 
design, urban scenery, authority requirements and realistic 
communication propagation model.  
DAA capabilities are assessed for representative urban 
scenes and sUAS routes, alongside with communications and 
navigational coverage throughout each defined mission, 
ensuring the sUAS functionality to safely perform flight 
operations. The scene geometry is based on 3D tiles extracted 
from globe view data in Google Maps 3D at the city of Milton 
Keynes (United Kingdom), where a medical delivery mission 
is performed. Once the 3D data are captured [40], an 
assembly and scaling process is performed in Blender [41], 
followed by tiling and georeferencing though the Cesium Ion 
[42] pipeline, and then is finally imported into STK.  
In Fig. 5, an overview of the flight phases is presented, 
featuring an actual representation of buildings, vegetation 
and streets at the mission location. The resulting scenery 
enables a more detailed study, for instance accounting for line 
of vision obscuration due to trees and urban canyons 1 . 
Therefore, DAA and GNSS navigation can be effectively 
assessed, for which the number of visible satellites is 
continuously monitored. 
For the mission, a set of objects commonly found in urban 
scenes (buildings, ground vehicles, vegetation and sUAS) are 
defined according to the objectives of the simulation at every 
flight stage: takeoff, cruise and landing. The first two stages 
consider airborne threats, while the landing accounts for both 
airborne and ground-based threats. During takeoff, a ground-
 
Fig. 4 DAA simulation components overview 
based obstacles Well Clear condition is assumed since the 
operator requires to prove these threats have been considered 
and properly mitigated; while on the other hand, unexpected 
conditions might lead to more crowded scenes for the landing 
stage, as for instance an emergency landing procedure, where 
the operator has no control over the potential obstacles and 
threats. Regarding the cruise, the flight takes place at a Well 
Clear height above the ceiling of the building, an extended 
practice for sUAS operations.  
Airborne objects include the sUAS platform performing 
the mission and other airspace users/intruders, against which 
the DAA capabilities are tested. Each sUAS is defined in 
terms of a performance model, including maneuvers 
capabilities as maximum speed and rate, and an aero-
propulsion model defines the powerplant and rotors 
specifications. Regarding onboard sensors, rather than 
extensive modelling for the numerous commercial options 
currently available for each category previously defined in 
Section II, an alternative approach is considered. The relative 
position and heading for each sUAS-obstacle pair are 
monitored during all flight stages, being analyzed by a hazard 
assessment metric based on safety volumes intersections, 
which are detailed at the end of subsection D.  
Ground-based objects are composed of ground vehicles 
and mission equipment. Ground vehicles represent a potential 
collision threat during the landing phase, in addition to static 
obstacles, such as trees and buildings. Communication 
antenna supports the safe operations at the ground.  
B. Hazard Assessment 
The DAA algorithm developed in Simulink/MATLAB 
uses a sensor configuration consisting of the monocular 
camera and LiDAR to assess the hazard. The hazard 
assessment starts with the definition of safety volumes for the 
sUAS and the hazards. The safety volumes of the moving 
objects, such us sUAS, birds, etc., are defined by considering 
the velocity of the objects. As buildings, the safety volume is 
defined with a set of points apart from the obstacle with the 
same distance if the object has a simple shape for the static 
and large obstacles. The complex shapes’ safety volume (e.g. 
trees) are defined as the minimum size of cylinder covering 
the object with a certain margin from the objects (see Fig. 6).  
After the calculation of the safety volumes, the common 
volume   is calculated if a hazard  , whose safety volume 
intersects with that of the sUAS, exists. The score of the 
priority to avoid a certain hazard is calculated as follows. If 
the common volume  is 0, the score for the hazard  is 0. If 
the common volume  is non-zero, the score for the hazard  
is 
  =   (1) 
where   is the danger level of the hazard defined by the 
user. 
For example, since it is more dangerous to conflict with the 
building than sUAS,   of the building will be defined larger 
than sUAS. In order to implement a hazard assessment to the 
DAA algorithm, relevant criteria need to be prepared. The 
hazard criteria is determined by assigning priority values by 
assessing the relationship between the hazard score 
established in Eq. 1. The priority levels are decided through 
categorising the score, decided from Eq.1. To normalise the 
volume intersection data scaling constant term,  	 , is 
introduced by assessing the data values of the score, . 
 	 ∝   (2) 
where    is the priority criteria. Combining both 
Equation (1) and (2), the relationship between safety volume 
and danger levels calculated for priority levels are represented 
in Table 3. 
























Intruder 5 4 4 3 1 
Ground 
Vehicle 
5 3 3 2 1 
Building(s) 5 3 3 1 1 
Foliage (Tree) 4 2 2 1 1 
Finally, to provide a more extensive analysis over DAA 
vision-based techniques, an alternative simulation 
environment integrated using MATLAB, Simulink and 
Unreal Engine is proposed supporting the main simulation 
environment. The sUAS Toolbox on Simulink connects the 
DAA model to the simulation environment in Unreal Engine, 
which is populated with the scene’s 3D tiles used in STK. This 
second setup allows the testing and implementation of 
collision avoidance techniques based on camera sensors, plus 
scene mapping via LiDAR. The objects positioning and 
behavior are inherited from the STK extracted states, 
providing a high-fidelity replica of the whole mission. 
 
 
(a)                    (b)                        (c) 
Fig. 5 Simulation environment urban scenes for each flight phase. Picture (a) shows a take-off stage, where a sUAS intruder flights nearby; in (b) a 
cruise over buildings and vegetation is presented, featuring a closer look to the platform and its payload; and finally, picture (c) showcases a crowded 
landing operation, where both ground and airborne objects are included invading the platform’s Well Clear space  
C. Simulation post-processing 
Postprocessing of the mission data is performed in 
MATLAB [43], which is, once integrated into the STK 
environment, allowing the definition of scene parameters and 
extraction of object states from missions. From sUAS and 
intruder’s flight attitude and georeferenced data, DAA 
capabilities are evaluated. For better accuracy of DAA 
simulation, STK-Unreal Engine connection is essential. 
Textures and mapping are translated to Unreal through 
exporting and importing as an object file where the textures 
are imported from their picture (.jpg or .png) equivalent to the 
Unreal blueprint scenario. A further connection is established 
using the Unreal-Simulink connection through sUAS 
Toolbox, as shown in Fig. 7. 
 The sensors implemented in Simulink for DAA testing are 
an onboard camera and LiDAR. Considering the onboard 
camera and LiDAR sensors on the sUAS, a sense and avoid 
algorithm is developed for hazard assessment implementing 
results and considerations from the previous simulation 
setups. To incorporate the risk assessment criteria, the 
intersected volume of the obstacle is processed and calculated 
using the disparity and segmentation map output of the 
Simulink 3D camera.  
The segmentation map is used for obstacle identification 
and the disparity map is utilized to visualize the distance of 
obstacles using a threshold. LiDAR is used to validate the 
distances of objects to the depth image. The vision-based 
algorithm utilizes morphological operators and blob detection 
techniques on the disparity map, which is communicated 
through the Unreal Engine. A simple avoidance scheme is 
utilized to demonstrate the recognition of volume hazard 
intersections. The monocular camera and LiDAR 
implemented in the Simulink DAA algorithm allow the 
detection of obstacle centroids, areas, and their respective 
distances. A visual geometry is set within the vision-based 
algorithm to represent the safety volume as illustrated in Fig. 
5c. Utilizing the position of the centroids and the relevant 
areas, the obstacle volume intersections can be calculated 
from the image. Priority levels are assigned using the criteria 
defined in Table 3, where the danger levels are defined 
through image segmentation.  
D. Communication effects 
The RF communications analysis setup is modelled 
parallel to the one previously seen, although it uses Shapefile 
geometry (see Fig. 8), which is created from buildings 
blueprints extrusion. This RF model accounts for diffraction 
losses and buildings, terrain, and ground reflections, enabling 
strategic antenna placement and flight routes planning. 
Default STK’s rain and clouds-fog models are applied to RF 
simulation, addressing atmospheric adversarial conditions 
during the mission.  
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, the results from the simulations address 
practical considerations to ensure safe operations. First, 
hazard assessment results are presented and discussed, 
analyzing how the different scene objects intervene in Well 
Clear volume keeping. Next, a set of practical considerations 
based on the developed simulation environment and the 
obtained results are presented.  
A. Hazard assessment simulation results 
The DAA utilized in Simulink is compared to the object 
detection in STK without avoidance. Detection in STK is 
achieved by defining a sensor with LiDAR characteristics, 
which calculates the distance, centroid positions, and the 
volume of obstacles defined in Table 3. Results are plotted in 
MATLAB to achieve accuracy using the same timesteps, , 
for better understanding of the hazard assessment between the 
two synthetic environments. The takeoff and landing phase 
present more challenges than the cruise phase, as expected 
due to the greater number of obstacles found. In Fig. 9 and 
Fig. 10 the resulting prioritization and collision avoidance for 
these two phases can be found; the corresponding scenarios 
from STK are represented in Fig. 5.  
 
 
Fig. 8 Communications coverage simulation, based on Shapefile geometry, 
for a 1 m antenna height. While closer and in-line-of-sight zones prove a 
robust coverage (blue), areas behind buildings suffer from severe 
degradation (red) 
 
Fig. 6 Hazard assessment volumes representation: safety volume for static 
objects (a), safety volume for complex shapes (b), and intersection volume 
between sUAS safety volume (left) and static (c)object safety volume (right) 
 
 
Fig. 7 STK – Simulink Integration 
 
From the prioritization without avoidance in STK (Fig. 9a 
and Fig. 10a) one can note that the avoidance input for the 
intruder sUAS presents a higher rate of change than the 
building during the takeoff, given the change in distance to 
the platform. However, for the landing phase example, the 
ground vehicle plays a major role in the final stage until the 
intruder sUAS suddenly enters the airspace, acquiring a 
higher degree of priority. These roles could be reverted for a 
different situation; however, it is worth mentioning that 
moving objects risks generally monopolize the prioritization 
over static objects.   
Once collision avoidance is introduced (Fig. 9b and Fig. 
10b), the prior results are validated, conferring higher 
priorities a greater banking angle (negative and positive 
values indicate left and right turns, respectively), while lower 
priorities result in less aggressive maneuvers. The required 
bank angle is commanded to the control unit and executed to 
maintain a Well Clear distance from it. 
B. Practical Considerations 
From the obtained results in simulation, the following 
points are presented to be considered for practical 
applications of the Detect and Avoid systems: 
1) sUAS navigation accuracy: The avoidance is 
conducted based on the information about the states of the 
sUAS and the obstacles. Thus, the performance of the 
avoidance algorithm  is highly affected by the accuracy of the 
sUAS state information from the navigation system. 
Additionally, navigation accuracy can be severely degraded 
in built up environments, including multi-path problems. 
Therefore, navigational equipment redundancy is strongly 
advised. Urban and vegetation canyons are advised to be 
avoided during all flight phases if possible, or adequately 
mitigated otherwise. For instance, in Fig. 11 Global 
Positioning System (GPS) loss is presented, transitioning 
from complete to zero coverage in a short distance due to 
trees obscuration. These issues can be addressed by 
implementing redundancy in the system, such as multi-
constellation/frequency GNSS systems. Finally, while 
theoretically a minimum of satellites would suffice for GNSS 
navigation, in practice acessing under 10 satellites might be 
considered poor coverage for a sUAS and prevent it from 
(a) Collision volume obstacle prioritization during takeoff 
(b) Avoidance prioritization during takeoff 
Fig. 9 Takeoff phase hazard assessment simulation results 
(a) Collision volume obstacle prioritization during landing 
(b) Avoidance prioritization during landing 
Fig. 10 Landing phase hazard assessment simulation results 
   
Fig. 11 GPS number of satellites visibility when entering an urban canyon. 
From left to right, from an initial number of 8 satellites, after a few meters 
the count descents to 4, and finally to 0, endangering the mission success 
taking off, postulating GNSS signal loss is a major concern 
for urban operations.   
2) Noise or bias on sensors to detect obstacles: Noise or 
bias on sensors will directly affect the performance of the 
detection algorithm. This will also affect the performance of 
the avoidance algorithm, since the avoidance is conduced 
based on the target information, which is estimated by the 
detection algorithm of the sUAS.  
3) Computational delay: If a fast obstacle suddenly 
appears, the sUAS must react rapidly for safe operation. 
Thus, the computational delays affect the performance of the 
Detect and Avoid algorithm, especially in urgent cases. 
4) Weather: It has a direct effect on the performance of 
the sUAS in various ways. Wind makes it difficult to control 
the attitude of the sUAS to follow the path. Rain can increase 
the noise on the camera image, which can degrade the 
performance of the detection algorithm. Rainfall can also 
reduce the RF coverage due to signal absorption by water 
droplets, a phenomenon observed in simulation results by 
significantly reducing the effective range of communications. 
In practice, this can often be experienced after heavy rainfall. 
5) Communications: An interrupted datalink for 
cooperative DAA compliance is required to remain secure 
throughout the whole mission, constantly receiving airspace 
information and broadcasting the sUAS flight data. 
Additionally, for remotely piloted flights where the DAA 
capabilities provide the operator with airspace information 
and maneuver advice against non-cooperative traffic, it is 
essential to continuously send commands to the sUAS and 
receive the flight data at the ground station.  According to 
simulation results, inner patios and building’s proximity tend 
to be with zero to low coverage areas and abrupt terrain 
elevations. Therefore, ground-based equipment should be 
strategically located at a Well Clear spot, ideally at a certain 
height, as for instance an in-route building rooftop. This 
alternative antenna placement result is illustrated in Fig. 12, 
placing the transmitter on a building roof with undisturbed 
visibility over the flight path, providing datalink robustness 
along the mission duration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a comprehensive review of the state-
of-the-art DAA technologies in conjunction with simulation 
of realistic urban scenarios for DAA potential challenges 
assessment. Different missions are designed and executed for 
representative scenes accounting for the common threads for 
each of the flight phases. Relevant factors such as RF 
degradation and navigational challenges, including urban 
canyons, complete the proposed simulation environment, 
complemented with DAA hazard assessment leading to 
effective threat identification.  
Compared to normal takeoff and landing over DAA 
takeoff and landing, the conflict of hazard mitigation and 
collision avoidance rate is higher. The obtained results show 
that DAA considerations integrated into sUAS have more 
significant collision avoidance and higher safety while 
operating in the airspace.  
In the future, this work can be extended with path 
planning and navigation algorithms and Simultaneous 
Localization and Mapping (SLAM) to support the sUAS, 
equipped with DAA technologies, locating itself in the urban 
environment. The capabilities of the volume intersection 
could be improved by accounting in the direction of the 
dynamic obstacles, possibly by utilizing the Doppler effect 
and the angle to the obstacle. Regarding communications 
aspects for urban environments, the analysis can be expanded 
by implementing cellular networks connectivity for sUAS, a 
major trend across the industry. 4G and 5G enabled sUAS 
present new challenges, therefore corresponding parameters 
have to be considered, such as network loading, for instance 
during peak usage hours, and handover between cell towers.  
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